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Understanding self-reported difficulties in decision-making by people with autism 
spectrum disorder 
 
Abstract 
Autobiographical accounts and a limited research literature suggest that adults with 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) can experience difficulties with decision-making.  We 
examined whether some of the difficulties they describe correspond to quantifiable 
differences in decision-making when compared to adults in the general population.    
The participants (38 intellectually able adults with ASD and 40  neurotypical controls) 
were assessed on three tasks of decision-making (Iowa Gambling Task, Cambridge 
Gamble Task, and Information Sampling Task), which quantified, respectively: 
decision-making performance, relative attention to negative and positive outcomes, 
speed, flexibility, and information sampling. .  As a caution, all analyses were repeated 
with a subset of participants (nASD=29 and nControl=39) who were not taking 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medication. Compared to controls, the participants with 
ASD demonstrated slower decision-making and superior performance on the Iowa 
Gambling Task. When those taking the medications were excluded, participants with 
ASD also  sampled  more information. There were no other differences between the 
groups.  These processing tendencies may contribute to the difficulties self-reported  in 
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some contexts;; however, the results also highlight strengths in ASD, such as a more 
logical approach to, and care in decision-making.  These findingslead to 
recommendations for how adults with ASD may be better supported with decision-
making.   
 
Keywords 
Autism spectrum disorder, decision-making, Iowa Gambling Task, Cambridge Gamble 
Task, Information Sampling Task  
 
Background 
Decision-making is a complex mental process, through which one of two or more 
possible options or actions is actively selected in order to reach a desired goal (Edwards, 
1954; Huitt, 1992).  People with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) report experiencing 
difficulties with certain features of decision-making more frequently than those  without 
the condition (Luke, Clare, Ring et al., 2012), and a small number of studies have 
evidenced atypical responses on standard decision-making paradigms (e.g. Johnson, 
Yechiam, Murphy et al., 2006).  However, it is still the case that relatively little 
information is available about the ways in which the decision-making of adults with 
ASD may be affected by the condition. This does not make it easy to make 
recommendations about how best they might be supported. .   
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The paucity of research in this area is surprising given the indication from a variety of 
sources that, even for intellectually able and articulate people with ASDs, decision-
making can be difficult., Autobiographical accounts, for example, describe how, for 
some people, , the decision-making process can become ‘locked up and overloaded with 
pictures coming in all at once’ (Grandin, 2000, p2), and how having to choose ‘on the 
spot’ can be very difficult for children with ASD (Sainsbury, 2000, p101).  These 
accounts are consistent with a teacher’s observation of delays in decision-making by 
children with Asperger syndrome (AS) (Winter, 2003), and parental perceptions of 
indecisiveness in young adults with AS (Johnson et al., 2006).  Moreover, recent self-
report data suggest that people with ASD frequently experience a number of difficulties 
in decision-making, including mental ‘freezing’, anxiety, exhaustion, slowness in 
reaching a decision, a tendency to collect  too much information, and impaired 
flexibility, such as making decisions on the basis of previous choices (Luke, 2011; Luke 
et al., 2012).   
 
In addition, there is a limited research literature suggesting, indirectly, that decision-
making may be affected by the neuropsychological differences implicated in ASD.  
These include impairments in executive functions (for review, see Hill, 2004), which 
are associated, in other clinical conditions, with impaired decision-making (e.g. Manes, 
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Sahakian, Clark et al., 2002; Marson, Chatterjee, Ingram et al., 1996), and high levels of 
anxiety (Gillott, Furniss and Walter, 2001), which can restrict the ability to think 
abstractly (Etzioni, 1988) and disturb the normal patterns of autonomic arousal present 
in decision-making (Miu, Heilman and Houser, 2008). 
 
Finally, a small number of laboratory studies involving non-social tasks have 
investigated decision-making in ASD.  The earliest of these (Johnson et al., 2006) used 
a version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, Bechara, Damasio, Damasio et al., 1999) to 
assess decision-making in ambiguous situations.  Compared to control participants 
(n=15), adolescents with AS (n=14) demonstrated a more erratic pattern of choices, 
which could result in disadvantageous decision-making (Yechiam, Busemeyer, Stout et 
al., 2005).  In addition, using a mathematical model, the Expectancy-Valence Learning 
(EVL) model (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002), Yechiam and his colleagues the study also 
found a non-significant trend for participants with AS to attend more to negative than 
positive outcomes of previous choices.  The authors proposed that this was caused by a 
sub-group of individuals with AS (40% of their sample) with an extreme attentional bias 
to loss.   Such a bias, if present, may account for the decision-related anxiety reported 
by some people with ASD, since they may perceive their previous decision-making  
more negatively than the neurotypical population. 
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Studies using other laboratory tasks also indicate possible differences in the decision-
making of people with ASD compared to the neurotypical population.  Minassian, 
Paulus, Lincoln et al. (2007) found similar flexibility in the decision-making of adults 
with ASD compared to the control group on a two-choice prediction task with a 
covertly manipulated error rate: both groups demonstrated a ‘win-stay/lose-shift’ 
strategy.  However, unlike the control group, the participants with ASD demonstrated a 
more pronounced ‘win-stay/lose-shift’ strategy when the error-rate was low.  This 
suggests that people with ASD may be influenced to a greater extent by increases in  the 
reinforcement schedule.  Similarly, Damiano, Aloi, Treadway et al. (2012) found that 
adults with ASD were prepared to expend more effort for monetary rewards than 
control participants on the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (Treadway, Buckholtz, 
Schwartzman et al., 2009), but demonstrated reduced sensitivity to the reward 
contingencies.  The authors related this to the high levels, among people with ASDs, of  
circumscribed interests, often pursued at any cost. More broadly, it suggests that, in 
some contexts, people with ASD may be less flexible in their decision-making. 
 
De Martino, Harrison, Knafo et al. (2008) have examined the effects of perceptual 
‘framing’ on monetary decisions.  The ‘framing effect’ describes the influence of the 
format in which the same options are presented (for example, by being worded in terms 
of gains or losses) on choice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  Compared to participants 
10 
 
from the neurotypical population, adults with ASD demonstrated less susceptibility to 
the framing effect, making more logically consistent choices.  Furthermore, they did not 
demonstrate autonomic responses indicative of emotional involvement in the task.  De 
Martino and his colleagues s proposed that ASD  reduces the typical reliance on 
emotional information and enhances logical consistency. There have been similar 
findings in the area of moral/social judgements  (Brewer, Catmur, Stovcos et al.,2015).  
Such processing differences t  may affect many everyday situations because the   
available information is often ambiguous and/or incomplete (De Martino, Kumaran, 
Seymore et al., 2006). 
 
Finally, Brosnan, Chapman and Ashwin (2014) found that adolescents with ASD 
gathered more information prior to making a decision on the ‘Jumping-to-conclusions 
Beads Task”, than a neurotypical control group, and proposed that ASD may be 
associated with a circumspect reasoning bias, leading to more careful decision-making. 
Such a proposal is consistent with self-reported slowness in decision-making  (Luke et 
al., 2012), which again may reflect a more cautious approach to seeking and 
collatinginformation (Luke, 2011).  The results presented by DeMartino et al. (2008) 
and Brosnan et al., (2014) have recently been integrated to support a Dual Process 
Theory Account of ASD (Brosnan, Lewton and Ashwin, 2016).  This account is based 
on the dual processing theories in cognitive psychology (e.g. Kahneman, 2003), which 
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propose that humans have two cognitive systems for decision-making: i) an intuitive 
style that is rapid and automatic, and ii) a deliberative style that is slower and effortful.  
In relating this account to people with  ASD, Brosnan and his colleagues found, first, 
that increases in autistic traits (assessed using the Autism Quotient, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright and Skinner et al., 2001) were associated with a bias towards deliberative 
reasoning (assessed using the Rational Experiential Inventory, Pacini and Epstein, 
1999), and, secondly, that young men with ASD responded in a more deliberative and 
less intuitive manner than controls on the Cognitive Reflection Task.     
 
The aim of this study was to examine empirically some of the possible ways in which 
decision-making may be different in ASD, when compared to the neurotypical 
population. This aim relates both to previous studies, and to some of the difficulties 
reported in  our previous study of self-reported experiences by people with ASD  (Luke 
et al., 2012).  Specifically, we wished to investigate : i) the relative attention paid to 
negative and positive outcomes of previous choices, with a sample size large enough to 
detect the non-significant difference trend reported by Johnson et al. (2006);ii) 
flexibility in decision-making; iii) latency of decision-making; and iv) the tendency to 
sample information. 
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.  These processes were assessed using established laboratory tasks.  While many 
paradigms for studying decision-making have been developed, such as questionnaires 
(e.g. Scott and Bruce, 1995) and assessments of biases (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, 1982), laboratory tasks can be used to present decisions visually, thereby 
reducing the requirement for imagination, which may be impaired in ASD (for example, 
Craig and Baron-Cohen, 1999), and provide objective measures of behaviour.  In 
addition, such tasks are often used to detect impairments in decision-making (see, for 
example, Bechara et al., 1999; Manes et al., 2002; Tchanturia, Liao, Uher et al., 2007).   
 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-eight adults with an ASD and forty neurotypical adults with no family history of 
ASD, aged 16 to 65 year took part; all had given consent.  The diagnostic inclusion 
criteria were: 
1. Independent confirmation from a clinical or other relevant service of a 
diagnosis of an ASD, or diagnosis confirmed using the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R, Lord, Rutter and Le Couteur, 
1994); and 
2. Scores on one of two additional screening measures, the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the Autism 
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Diagnostic Observation Schedule Module 4, (ADOS, Lord, Rutter, 
Goode et al., 1989), consistent with the clinical or ADI-R diagnosis.  If 
the clinical report lacked detail about the assessment procedure or did 
not report taking a developmental history (11 participants), inclusion 
criteria were scores on both the ADOS and AQ consistent with the 
clinical diagnosis. 
 
Using these criteria, 34 out of 38 participants had ASD diagnoses confirmed with either 
the ADI-R or the ADOS.  The remaining four participants were included because we 
received independent confirmation of their diagnosis from a clinical service describing a 
thorough assessment, and they scored above the clinical cut-off on the AQ.  Due to 
resource constraints we only conducted our own ADI in the absence of independent 
confirmation of diagnosis from a clinical service. In six cases, an ADI had recently 
carried out as part of another, unrelated, study by  the same research group. 
Participants with ASD were recruited from volunteer databases and advertisements to 
members of autism-support organisations.  Control participants were recruited via local 
advertisements and by word-of-mouth.  Recruitment and testing was carried out in 
2009.  Exclusion criteria for both groups were diagnoses of schizophrenia or related 
disorders, ADHD, bipolar depression, a tested Verbal IQ score below 90, significant 
and regular recreational drug use, and self-report of significant head trauma with lasting 
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effects on cognition. The groups were matched for age, gender, and Verbal IQ (see 
Table 1).  Verbal IQ was assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
– Revised (WASI, Wechsler, 1999).  All participants received payment as a token of 
appreciation.   
 
The target sample size was 45 participants in each group, which theoretically would 
have  detected a group difference on the computational model of the IGT of the same 
magnitude as that reported by Johnson et al. (2006) with almost 90% power at α = 0.1 
(one-tailed).  Unfortunately, it was not possible to recruit more than 38 adults with ASD 
in the time available. 
   
Measures 
Decision-making tasks. 
1. Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, see Bechara et al., 1999), to assess relative attention 
to negative and positive outcomes of previous choices (study aim i).  In brief, 
participants are presented with a row of four decks of cards on a computer 
screen and asked to make repeated selections from the decks to win as much 
money as possible.  Successful performance depends upon learning to select the 
two decks covertly associated with long-term gain rather than the two  
associated with long-term loss (for deck contingencies, see Table 2).  To 
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maintain motivation, participants were informed that they would receive an 
unspecified performance-related payment at the end of the task. The study aimed 
to present 150 trials; however, due to a technical problem, data were available 
only from the first 115 trials. 
Data were analysed using the Expectancy-Valence Learning (EVL) model 
(Busemeyer and Stout, 2002), which quantifies, as the dependent variable, the 
relative attention paid to wins and losses of previous choices (the motivation 
parameter). The attention weight parameter ranges between 0 and 1, with 
0characterising a decision-maker greatly attracted to wins and indifferent to 
losses, and 0 characterising a decision-maker with a strong aversion to loss.  
Drawing on the findings of Johnson et al. (2006), we predicted that participants 
would demonstrate greater attention to negative outcomes, compared to the 
control participants. The proportion of advantageous selections over the task 
(task performance) is also reported.  
 
2. Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT, Rogers, Everitt, Baldacchino et al., 1999), to 
assess flexibility (study aim ii) and latency (study aim iii) in decision-making.  
In this task, flexibility is assessed as responsiveness to changes in probabilistic 
information; typically, participants will risk a greater proportion of points as the 
probability of success increases (see Sinz, Zamarian, Benke et al., 2008).  The 
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CGT is part of the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery 
(CANTAB, for details see http://www.cambridgecognition.com/technology).  In 
brief,  a row of 10 boxes is presented on a computer screen, with a ratio of red to 
blue boxes that differs on each trial (72 trials), ranging from 9:1 to 1:9.  
Participants are told that the computer has hidden a token under one of the boxes 
and they are asked to guess the colour of the box that is hiding the token.  They 
are then asked to bet a proportion of their points on their choice being correct.  
The optional bets are presented 2.5 seconds apart in ascending or descending 
order depending on the condition of the task.  The dependent variables are i) 
risk-taking, which is the mean proportion of points bet on each of the different 
trial types (i.e. ratio of blue to red) in each condition, and, when assessed across 
trial types, also provides an indication of flexibility in response to probabilistic 
information; and ii) deliberation time (latency),  the time from presentation of 
the stimuli to  the participant touching their chosen colour on the  screen).  We 
predicted that participants with ASD would demonstrate reduced flexibility and 
longer decision-making latencies, compared to the control participants. The 
proportion of trials on which participants choose the most likely colour (quality 
of decision-making) is also reported because it provides information about the 
extent to which they  understand, and are engaged by, the task. 
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Information Sampling Task (IST, Clark, Robbins, Ersche et al., 2006), to assess 
information gathering (study aim iv).  The IST is also part of the CANTAB.  In brief,  a 
5x5 grid of 25 grey boxes on a computer-screen is presented,‘behind’ each box is one of 
two hidden colours.  Participants are instructed to open (by pressing) a box to reveal its 
colour and to open as many boxes as they wish before deciding which of the two 
colours is in the majority.  Participants are presented with 10 trials in: i) a Fixed-Win 
condition, in which the total number of points available for a correct decision is 100, 
regardless of how many boxes are opened; and ii) a Decreasing-Win condition, in which 
the total number of points available for a correct decision starts at 250 and decreases by 
10 points with every box that is opened.  In both conditions, the cost of an incorrect 
decision is 100 points.  The dependent variable is mean ‘Probability Correct’ 
(P(Correct)),  the mean probability that the decision-made will be correct, given the 
information available at the time of the decision (for the calculation, see Clark et al., 
2006).  In general, P(Correct) increases as more information is sampled  and is 
considered to be a more ecologically valid variable than the number of boxes opened.  
This is because, under certain circumstances, the mean number of boxes opened can 
provide only a limited index of the amount of information gathered (see Clark, Roiser, 
Robbins et al., 2009).  We predicted that, compared to the control group, the 
participants with ASD would sample information so as to increase the likelihood of 
making the correct decision. 
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Motor Speed. Motor speed on the touch screen computer was assessed using CANTAB 
Motor Screening Task (MOT). Participants used the tip of the forefinger of their 
dominant hand to touch 10 crosses as they appeared on the screen.  
 
Mood. Levels of anxiety and depression were assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS, Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). 
 
The questionnaires, WASI, and the MOT were completed at the beginning of the testing 
session.  The order of the three decision-making tasks was counter-balanced across 
participants using a Latin Squares design to reduce potential order effects. 
  
Data analysis 
Prior to analysis, scores expressed as proportions of binomial events were transformed 
using the arcsine transformation, as recommended by Howell (1997).  Other data types 
were transformed to reduce skew and improve suitability for parametric analysis.   
Individual outliers (defined as more than three times the inter-quartile range from the 
upper or lower quartile after transformation) were excluded for parametric analyses.  
Data were analysed using repeated-measures ANOVA and t-tests.  Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections were applied where the assumption of sphericity was not met.  Non-
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parametric equivalents to t-tests were used to compare data with distributions that 
remained non-normal after transformation.     
 
Levels of anxiety and depression (HADS scores) were statistically controlled for where 
there was a significant relationship with the dependent variable.  Such a relationship 
was assessed prior to analysis using: i) correlation analyses in the case of a single 
variable, and ii) including the measure as a covariate in the case of repeated measures 
ANOVA.    There was no relationship between levels of depression and the dependent 
variables.  However, there was a relationship between levels of anxiety and run lengths 
on the IGT and P(Correct) on the IST (described below).   
 
Of note, nine participants with an ASD and one control participant were taking 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medication, which may have effects on decision-making 
similar to those described by Deakin, Aitken, Dowson et al. (2004a).  In the interests of 
caution, all analyses are carried out with and without these participants to check that 
their medications did not affect  the results.  Changes to the results are reported 
separately from the main analysis.  Supplementary Table A presents descriptive 
information for the groups of participants not taking the antidepressant or anxiolytic 
medication.    
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Results 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
The participants with ASD reported significantly higher levels of anxiety and 
depression (see Table 1). 
 
Motor Screening Task 
The response latencies did not differ between the groups (MASD=861.1 msec, SD=249.3; 
MControl=853.6 msec, SD=187.2, t(76)=0.151, p=.881).  
  
Iowa Gambling Task 
Three participants in the control group were excluded because they responded 
abnormally; these participants made over eighty consecutive selections from one deck 
before sampling the other decks. 
 
Task performance. The proportion of advantageous choices for each consecutive block 
of twenty-three selections is shown in Figure 1.  The transformed proportions were 
analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA of Block × Group (nASD=38, nControl=37).  
There was a main effect of Block (F(3.46, 252)=26.7, p<.001), Group (F(1, 73)=4.49, 
p=.037), and a Block × Group interaction (F(3.46, 252)=4.44, p=.003).  A simple-
effects analysis revealed that the interaction was due to a greater number of selections 
21 
 
from the advantageous decks by the ASD group in the final block of trials 
(F(1, 73)=9.01, p=.004). 
 
EVL parameter. The fit of the EVL model was evaluated using the procedure described 
by Johnson et al. (2006). The fit of the model was satisfactory: the EVL model provided 
a better fit than the control (Bernoulli) model for 80% of the participants.  The mean 
parameter estimate for attention to loss (range: 0 to 1, where 1 reflects high attention to 
loss) did not differ between the groups (MASD=0.43, SD=0.27; MControl=0.48, SD=0.28, 
t(73)=-0.739, p=.462).  In contrast to Johnson et al. (2006), there was no evidence that a 
sub-group of participants with ASD demonstrated an extreme attentional bias to loss 
(four participants with ASD and five controls had parameter estimates of 1).  
 
The participants with ASD made significantly longer stretches of consecutive choices 
from the advantageous decks; these data were log transformed to reduce skew and 
included anxiety as a covariate (Mean maximum run length on the advantageous decks: 
MASD= 29.6, SD=27.2; MControl=12.1, SD=16.2, F(1,72)=7.246, p=.009). 
 
Cambridge Gamble Task 
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Quality of decision-making. Compared to the control group, the most logical choice was 
selected by the participants with ASD on a smaller proportion of trials (MASD=0.96, 
SD=0.068; MControls=0.98, SD=0.087, Mann-Whitney U test, p=.022). 
 
Exclusion of participants taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication 
Following exclusion of the 10 participants taking the antidepressant and anxiolytic 
medications, this difference between the groups was no longer statistically significant 
(nASD=29, nControl=39, MASD=0.97, SD=0.012; MControls=0.98, SD=0.014, Mann-Whitney 
U test, p=.216).  
 
Flexibility. The proportion of points risked (see Figure 2) were arcsine transformed and 
analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA of Trial type (9:1, 8:2, 7:3, 6:4, 5:5) × 
Group.  The groups did not differ in the proportion of points bet on the task (risk-
taking), F(1, 76)=1.407, p=.239).  Moreover, the Trial type × Group interaction was not 
significant (F(1.690, 128.429)=0.052, p=.926), indicating that both groups flexibly 
adjusted their choices in response to changes in the probabilistic information. 
 
Latency. Deliberation times (see Figure 3) were reciprocally transformed to reduce 
skew and analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA of Trial type × Group.  
Compared to the control group, the participants with ASD took longer to make the 
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decisions (F(1, 76)=8.18, p=.005).  The Trial type × Group interaction was not 
significant (F(2.744, 208.567)=1.654, p=.182).   
 
Information Sampling Task 
The mean P(Correct) scores (see Figure 4) were arcsine transformed and analysed using 
a repeated-measures ANOVA of Condition (Fixed Win, Decreasing Win) × Group 
(nASD=38, nControl=40).  There was no effect of Group (F(1, 76)=1.736, p=.0.192) or 
Condition × Group interaction (F(1, 76)=0.273, p=.603).   
 
Exclusion of participants taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication 
One participant in the control group was an outlier in the Decreasing Win condition and 
excluded from the analysis (nASD=29, nASD=38).  There was a significant effect of 
anxiety when assessed using repeated measures ANCOVA (F(1, 64)=5.510, p=0.022), 
which appeared to reflect a non-significant, but negative correlation between anxiety 
and the dependent variables; anxiety was therefore included as a covariate in the 
between-group analysis.  There was main effect of Group (F(1, 64)=9.713, p=.003), 
suggesting that  the participants with ASD sampled information to a higher probability 
of being correct than the control group. 
 
Discussion   
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This paper reports an empirical investigation of several decision-making processes in 
intellectually able adults with ASD to complement previous subjective reports of 
difficulties: decision-making performance, attention to negative and positive outcomes, 
flexibility to changes in probabilistic information, speed of decision-making, and 
information sampling.  These processes were assessed to establish whether some of the 
experiences reported by adults with ASD are consistent with any differences in 
decision-making processes measured on laboratory tasks. .   
 
Compared to neurotypical controls, the participants with ASD demonstrated 
significantly longer decision-making latencies on the CGT, and, a tendency to make 
decisions with a higher probability of being correct on the IST.  These findings are 
consistent with self-reports of a tendency to spend excessive  time collecting and 
collating information (Luke, 2011), reaching a decision (Luke et al., 2012; Winter, 
2003) and indecisiveness (Johnson et al., 2006). Longer deliberation times did not 
appear to reflect impairments in motor speed, and is consistent with previous research 
demonstrating reduced response speed to comprehension questions in ASD (Bowler, 
1997).  It is, of course, possible that the increased latency reflects slower perceptual 
processing of the number of coloured boxes.  However, this interpretation is not 
supported by a previous study demonstrating comparable inspection times between 
individuals with ASD and control participants (Wallace, Anderson and Happé, 2009). 
25 
 
 
The tendency for participants with ASD to sample more information than controls on 
the IST is consistent with the report by Brosnan et al. (2014) that adolescents with ASD 
sampled more information prior to deciding from which jar a coloured bead may have 
been drawn. This was formulated as a ‘circumspect reasoning bias’.  We support this 
formulation by demonstrating that participants with ASD sampled more information 
even when penalised for doing so (in this case, by a loss of points in the Decreasing 
Win condition, in which participants lost 10 points for every box sampled). 
   
Contrary to the findings of Johnson et al. (2006), the EVL model analysis of the IGT 
data did not suggest that participants with ASD were more attentive than controls to 
negative rather than positive outcomes of previous choices.  Moreover, there was no 
evidence of a sub-group of participants with ASD with an extreme attentional bias to 
loss. The differences between our findings and those of the previous study  may reflect: 
i) the difference in ages of the sample populations (adolescents in Johnson et al., 2006)), 
since decision-making is affected by age (see Deakin, Aitken, Robbins et al., 2004b); ii) 
a poorer fit of the EVL model (a satisfactory fit for only 55% of participants in Johnson 
et al. (2006), compared to 80% in the present study); and iii) the difference in the study 
sample sizes (15 AS participants in Johnson et al., 2006).  Overall, the findings from the 
present study suggest the difficulties reported by people with ASD, such as anxiety 
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about decision-making, are not accounted for by an increased attention to negative 
outcomes of previous decisions.   
 
Of interest, however, compared to the controls, the participants with ASD made more 
advantageous choices on the IGT.  This finding, again,  differs from the results of of 
Johnson et al. (2006), and from other researchers who have used the IGT (Yechiam et 
al., 2010, Faja et al., 2013, and Mussey et al., 2015.  However, our findings  are, 
consistent with those reported by South et al. (2014).  Given that all the above studies 
involved children or adolescents of at least average intellectual ability, it is possible that 
the apparent discrepancy between different studies reflects sample size, since the largest 
samples were those of the present study (n=38) and South et al. (n=48). Adding weight 
to the results of South et al. (2014),  our findings extend the age range for which 
superior performance on the IGT in ASD has been demonstrated. 
We were surprised that, on the IGT,  three of the control participants made over eighty 
selections from a single deck before sampling from the other decks.  This was one of the 
advantageous decks. It is possible, though unlikely, that these participants had previous 
experience of the task, though they did not volunteer that they had.  More plausibly, 
perhaps, their response reflected limited engagement and boredom with the task.  No 
participants with ASD appeared to respond abnormally and they all sampled each of the 
decks.  The tendency for the superior performance of those with  ASD (characterised by 
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more consistent advantageous selections in the later stages of the task) may reflect 
speedier comprehension of the contingencies associated with long-term gains, and/or 
greater ability to focus on maintaining a more repetitive but logically advantageous 
strategy.      
 
The tendency for participants with ASD to make more advantageous selections on the 
IGT is consistent with subjective and experimental reports of enhanced logic in 
decision-making in ASD (De Martino et al., 2008; Luke et al., 2012), as well as the 
superior systemising hypothesis of ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2009).  Moreover, a tendency 
to attempt a more logical analysis of decisions, which demands time and cognitive 
resources, could account for the  perception of ‘effortful’ processing reported by people 
with ASD (Luke et al., 2012).   
 
The other decision-making processes assessed (attention to negative and positive 
outcomes, and flexibility) did not differ between the groups.  One possible explanation, 
though it cannot easily be reconciled with our positive findings on other tasks is that 
they may reflect the difference between the laboratory tasks, which present simple 
decisions in controlled and quiet surroundings that are likely to enable participants with 
ASD to perform at their best, and decisions in real life, which may involve multiple 
response options, busy environments, be of personal significance, and often have to be 
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made under   pressure of time (c.f. Sainsbury’s (2000) description of the difficulty in in 
choosing food “on the spot” was given in the context of of the lunch queue in a school 
canteen, P101).   
 
Overall, the profile of results observed in this study (slower, logical and perhaps more 
effortful decision-making, with non-significant differences for attention to positive and 
negative outcomes) seems to support a Dual Process Theory Account of ASD (Brosnan 
et al., 2016).  Specifically, this account suggests that ASD is associated with a 
consistent bias towards slower, deliberative decision-making and away from intuitive 
decision-making.  While such a reasoning style may be beneficial for some tasks (e.g. 
mathematics), it may contribute to the characteristic difficulty in social communication 
in ASD, which requires the rapid integration of social and, often, contextual 
information.     
 
Levels of anxiety, assessed using the HADS, appeared to affect the results for two of the 
measures in the present study.  First, we found that anxiety correlated positively with 
longer stretches of consecutively advantageous choices; this suggests that higher levels 
of anxiety in the ASD group may contribute to the observed group effect.  Previous 
research findings regarding the relationship between anxiety and IGT performance are 
mixed (see, for example Miu et al., 2008; Werner, Duschek and Schandry, 
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2009).However, the relationship we observed is consistent with studies suggesting that 
higher levels of trait anxiety are associated with reduced risk-taking choices (Giorgetta, 
Grecucci, Zuanon et al., 2012).  Secondly, there was a significant effect of anxiety on 
P(Correct) on the IST.  Interestingly, for this analysis, the group difference found on the 
IST appeared to be moderated by anxiety: higher levels of anxiety were weakly 
associated with reduced information sampling. A similar effect has been observed in 
neurotypical participants with experimentally-induced anxiety, who tended to ‘jump to 
conclusions’ when completing the beads task (Lincoln, Lange, Burau et al., 2010).  In 
noting this, however, we concur with Lincoln and her colleagues that there may be 
significant individual variation in the impact of anxiety on reasoning styles.      
 
This study has limitations.  As discussed above, the finding that the participants with 
ASD took longer to make decisions on the CGT may reflect an overall weakness in 
cognitive speed, rather than processes involved specifically in decision-making.  
Inclusion of a measure of general cognitive processing speed would have provided an 
opportunity to identify, and control for, any differences in cognitive speed between the 
groups.  In addition, although the decision-making tasks used have been established to 
identify cognitive differences between clinical groups, they clearly lack ecological 
validity, both in their content and the laboratory conditions in which they are carried 
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out.  Moreover, the tasks did not include elements of social decision-making, which is 
proving to  be an area of direct relevance in ASD (for example, Brewer et al., 2015). 
 
In addition, the age range of the participants was rather wide.  Since age is an important 
factor in decision-making (Deakin, Aitken, Robbins et al., 2004), the statistical analyses 
may have been more powerful in a narrower age range of participants.  However, the 
groups did not significantly in the distribution of age.  While inclusion of age as a 
covariate might be possible, it was not included here because it did not differ with both 
the independent and dependent variables (Boniface, 1995).  
 
Research implications 
Given the diverse findings on the IGT between different studies, further research aiming 
to understand these differences is desirable.  In addition, the relationship between 
anxiety and decision-making appears to be complicated, depending upon the decision-
making context, and potentially the individual characteristics of the decision-maker.  
Given the importance of anxiety in the lives of  both children and adults with the 
condition (Kim et al., 2000; Skokouskas & Gallagher, 2010), such studies are rather 
urgently required. More generally, future studies relating to decision-making should 
consider assessing decision-making in ASD using  both tasks and contexts with greater 
ecological validity  A starting point for such research could be the adaptation of the 
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paradigms developed by Braeutigam and  his colleagues (Ambler, Braeutigam, Stins et 
al., 2004; Braeutigam, Stins, Rose et al., 2001).  Their tasks involve shopping decisions 
(a class of decision that was identified as problematic in several of the survey accounts) 
and have enabled identification of several neural processes involved in decision-
making, such as silent vocalisation and the effect of familiarity on choice.  Other 
paradigms could be developed that present medical and other legally-significant 
decisions, or decisions with several stages, such as planning a journey.  The 
development of  such tasks may promote investigations of the difficullties reported by 
people with ASD that can more easily be linked to support for individuals with ASD 
and their care-givers.  
 
Practical  implicationsDespite the limitations of the study, the findings from this 
substantial sample of people with ASD demonstrate that, under experimental 
conditions, performance on tasks involving the decision-making processes of 
quality/logic (IGT) and flexibility (CGT) is not impaired and indeed, can be of 
comparable, or even superior, quality to that of neurotypical controls. Unfortunately, the 
experiences of everyday decision-making by people with ASD remain negative (Luke et 
al., 2012). Previously, we made a number of recommendations intended to improve 
their experiences, for example, that encouragement and reassurance were needed to 
challenge the negative self-perceptions of decision-making of our respondents, and, as 
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far as possible, that time-constraints should be relaxed to minimise feelings of pressure 
to make  a choice. The findings of this study provide some empirical basis for these 
recommendations. For example, the evidence that, even for the very straightforward  
task involving simple probability (the CGT), and under favourable laboratory 
conditions, participants with ASD needed longer to deliberate before making a choice 
supports our recommendation that people with the condition should not feel rushed into 
making decisions. This is particularly important where the decision is legally-significant 
or potentially life-changing (for example, whether to give or withhold consent to a 
complex medical procedure).   Similarly, the enhanced information-sampling 
demonstrated by our ASD participants on a visual task (the IST) supports our previous 
recommendation about minimizing information that is irrelevant to the decision to be 
made. The provision of relevant material, clearly set out, may assist people with ASD to 
focus on the analytical part of the process, which appears to be a strength associated 
with the condition, without becoming distracted, and  overwhelmed by, collecting  more 
and more information.  .  Finally, given that the majority of ASD participants in this 
study  had levels of anxiety above the normal range, consideration should be given to 
the possible effects of anxiety on their decision-making; access to psychological or 
pharmacological therapies to reduce anxiety is likely also be beneficial.   
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Our recommendations in relation to supporting decision-making remain general: the 
range of responses of the participants with ASD emphasises the need to provide 
practical support based on individuals’ assessed  strengths and weaknesses. 
Nevertheless, since they are evidence-based, they may be of assistance in providing 
guidance to supplement the recent, and very welcome, attempts to create ‘autism-
friendly’ social (https://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2016/jun/10/no-
silence-plea) and physical (http://www.scottishautism.org/about-autism/research-and-
training/design-autism)  environments.  
Conclusion 
  The findings indicate that adults with ASD can, at least in laboratory situations 
circumstances, make as good or overall better decisions than adults in the general 
population.  However, consistent with the subjective decision-making difficulties 
reported, we found that, compared to a neurotypical control group, this sample of 
intellectually able adults with ASD demonstrated slower decision-making speed, a 
tendency to sample more information prior to making decisions (consistent with the 
circumspect reasoning bias hypothesis), and more logical choices perhaps reflecting 
more effortful processing.  These findings provide an empirical basis for our previous 
recommendations about supporting decision-making by people with ASDs (Luke et al. 
2012).  
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Table 1.  Participant characteristics 
Characteristic  
ASD group 
(n = 38) 
Control Group 
(n = 40) 
Test of group difference 
% male 65.8 67.5 χ2=0.03, p=0.87 
Mean age in years 34.1 (15.4) 34.0 (14.7) Mann-Whitney U, p=0.91 
Mean  tested Verbal IQ  116.4 (10.2) 114.2 (11.9) t(76)=0.89, p=0.38 
HADS: Anxiety  10.6 (3.6) 5.4 (2.7) t(76)=7.27, p<0.001 
HADS: Depression 4.7 (3.2) 1.6 (1.6) Mann-Whitney U, p<0.001 
 
Table 1 shows a summary of the characteristics of both groups.  Mean (SD).  These results did 
not change when the participants taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication were excluded.  
HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale.  
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Table 2.  Contingency scheme for the IGT (as used by Bechara et al. 1994) 
Deck Win Lose 
Net profit over 
10 trials 
A 
$50 every card 
$50 with probability 1∕2 
+$250 
B $250 with probability 1∕10 
C 
$100 every card 
$150, 200, 250, 300 or 350 each with probability 1∕10 
-$250 
D $1250 with probability 1∕10 
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Table A.  Participant characteristics (excluding participants taking antidepressants or 
anxiolytic medication) 
Characteristic  
ASD group 
(n = 38) 
Control Group 
(n = 40) 
Test of group difference 
% male 62.1 69.2 χ2=0.38, p=0.54 
Mean age in years 30.7 (14.0) 34.2 (14.9) Mann-Whitney U, p=0.24 
Mean tested Verbal IQ  116.7 (11.0) 114.1 (12.0) t(66)=0.90, p=0.37 
HADS: Anxiety  10.3 (356) 5.3 (2.7) t(66)=6.74, p<0.001 
HADS: Depression 4.1 (2.7) 1.6 (1.6) Mann-Whitney U, p<0.001 
 
Table 2 shows a summary of the characteristics of both groups, excluding participants taking 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medication.  Mean (SD).  HADS = Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale.  
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Figure 1.  Performance on the IGT for each group of participants 
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Figure 2.  Mean proportion of points bet across different trial types of the CGT 
 
  
49 
 
Figure 3.  Mean deliberation times for each group of participants on the CGT  
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Figure 4.  The mean P(Correct) scores for each group of participants on the IST  
 
 
 
 
 
 
